This study used a three-person mixed-motive negotiation to (1) investigate the effects of asymmetrical caucusing (i.e., negotiations in which parties possess unequal opportunities to engage in discussion) on group negotiations and (2) assess potential explanations for these effects. Negotiators who were excluded from part of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who remained throughout the discussion, and those who were excluded from the latter half of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who were excluded from the beginning. In addition, groups that excluded the low power negotiator from part of the discussion achieved less integrative agreements than groups that excluded the high power negotiator and groups that retained all negotiators throughout the discussion. The results highlight the importance of negotiator participation for gaining a share of rewards and the critical role played by negotiators with low power for determining the quality of agreements reached. ᭧ 1997 Academic Press Due to their potential for addressing the interests of multiple parties, group negotiations have become a pervasive aspect of social interaction (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985) . Group negotiations also create new challenges, however, because the complexity of negotiations increases with a group's size and the accompanying strategic opportunities to enhance one's negotiating position (cf.
. Under these circumstances, the effectiveness of group negotiation depends to an increasing degree on members' management of their knowledge and behaviors (Ancona, 1987; Silver, Cohen, & Rainwater, 1988) . This study examines how differences in the coordination of group negotiations can influence the allocation of rewards and quality of settlements reached.
Symmetrical Caucuses
Some effects of coordination in group negotiations have been investigated recently by studies that varied the structure of negotiator interactions (Mannix, 1993b; Palmer & Thompson, 1995) . These studies assessed differences that would arise if group members were allowed to negotiate all at once (joint meetings) versus in a series of one-on-one meetings (caucuses) that offered each party an equal opportunity to negotiate privately with each of the other negotiators. Despite some differences in approach, both studies found that caucusing reduced the inclusiveness of negotiated outcomes (a higher incidence of two-versus three-way agreements). They also attributed these effects to increases in a group's competitive orientation.
Asymmetrical Caucuses
Although this explanation is plausible, it may overlook a range of other factors that may provide alternative explanations for these effects. Prior studies have been ill-suited for assessing these alternative mechanisms because they do not adequately capture the manner in which most group negotiations are conducted. Caucusing generally does not occur in perfect symmetry, where each party is given equal opportunity to negotiate with each of the other members in the group. Rather, group negotiators generally initiate private, noninclusive meetings with the intent of forming a coalition that includes some parties while excluding others and, thus, improve the included parties' chances of achieving their goals (Mannix, 1993a) . Thus, by requiring that negotiators have equal opportunities to negotiate with each of the other parties, the potential for these alternative social mechanisms to be identified (e.g., those that depend on the contributions of the low power party) may be reduced.
Strategic Timing
Caucuses can occur at any time during the negotiation as parties foresee their need and can be composed in different ways depending on their purpose. We can observe these types of activities quite frequently in the legislative actions of political parties, for example, as majority factions attempt to form coalitions that are sufficiently strong to pass legislation without input from the minority and in efforts by the minority to form similar coalitions either in anticipation of or in response to this majority threat so they can increase their influence on this legislation. These kinds of activities illustrate that negotiators may often exclude a party from parts of a discussion because they believe it will improve their outcomes in the negotiation. Indeed, the bargaining behavior of negotiators in group negotiations may be significantly influenced by the conditions in which they interact (the relative power of the parties, the offers and counteroffers that have been made, etc.) (Psathas & Stryker, 1965; Stryker & Psathas, 1960) . However, studies have not been conducted to determine how this strategy can truly influence negotiator success. Research on caucusing in multiparty negotiations has not examined whether the delayed entry of a party into a negotiation or the continuation of negotiation after a party leaves the discussion (i.e., the movement dynamic) influences either the allocation of resources among negotiators or the quality of the agreement reached. Research on caucusing has also neglected to examine whether these outcomes are influenced by who it is that enters or leaves the negotiation (i.e., the power dynamic).
For insight into these strategic issues, we need to broaden our focus beyond the few available studies on caucusing in group negotiations to consider research on group development and group socialization. Whereas group development concerns changes over time in the group as a whole, group socialization concerns changes over time in the relationship between the group and its members (Moreland & Levine, 1988) . Although both fields of inquiry investigate temporal changes in groups, each provides a unique insight into the strategic implementation of asymmetrical caucusing in group negotiations.
Group development.
Research on group development (see Braaten, 1974; Cissna, 1984; Hare, 1973; Lacoursiere, 1980; Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977 for reviews) suggests that groups progress through several distinct stages. Due to differences in these stages, activities that predominate in one stage should rarely occur in others (Moreland & Levine, 1988) . Of course, research on group development has generally focused on groups that interact over significant periods of time and it is possible that the duration of most group negotiations may be insufficient to allow negotiators to progress fully through all of these group development stages.
1 Negotiation may also require parties to progress through stages that are quite different from those described by group development theory (Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977) . However, to the extent that parties participate in different activities during different periods of a negotiation, we might expect that the consequences of asymmetrical caucusing will vary depending on when it is initiated and the activities that dominate at that time. This reasoning suggests that the time in which asymmetrical caucuses are initiated should affect the behaviors displayed and outcomes achieved in group negotiation.
Group socialization. Research on group socialization (Levine & Moreland, 1985; Moreland & Levine, 1982 , 1984 often highlights the tension that arises from group efforts to maximize an individual's contributions to group goals (through the individual's assimilation) and attempts by the individual to maximize the group's contribution to personal goals (through the group's accommodation). One determinant of the success of these parties in these endeavors is the relative power of the individual versus the group. Whereas relatively powerful groups may behave more assertively when socializing less powerful new members, nonestablished members who are relatively powerful may behave more assertively during this process. This reasoning suggests that the relative power of the party included and excluded when asymmetrical caucuses are initiated should affect the behaviors displayed and outcomes achieved in group negotiations.
Objective
An assessment of these issues is important not only for the practical and strategic implications they entail but also for the insight they may shed into the mechanism(s) that underlie them. Specifically, it is possible that the detrimental impact from caucusing may not arise from its impact on competitive behavior per se (Mannix, 1993b; Palmer & Thompson, 1995) but rather on influences that can only be identified when negotiators are given unequal opportunities to negotiate (e.g., constraints on the ability of low power parties to drive higher quality agreements). This study will investigate these alternatives by using a three-person mixed-motive negotiation, in which parties represent different organizational departments who are charged with constructing a two-or three-party interdepartmental alliance. It will use this context to (1) explore the effects of asymmetrical caucusing on the allocation of resources among members and the quality of agreements reached and (2) determine whether explanations that have previously been provided for the impact of caucusing on group negotiations (i.e., increases in competitive orientations) can sufficiently explain these effects.
Allocations
One of the most reliable factors influencing the allocation of rewards is the relative power in the negotiation. Power or negotiating strength has been called the "essence of bargaining" (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981) and has been operationalized in a number of ways, including the attractiveness of a negotiator's alternatives and the value that party can contribute to the deal. The better one's own alternative relative to the alternatives of the other parties, the larger one's piece of the resource pie (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994) . Alternatively, the more value a party can add to an agreement, the greater that party's entitlement and their ability to demand a greater share of the reward (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959 , Emerson, 1964 .
Situations in which the value of the settlement depends on and varies with who is included in the final agreement have been suggested to apply to a wider range of organizational situations than those in which the settlement value does not vary (Komorita & Hamilton, 1984; Mannix, 1993b) . Because the value of the settlement also varies in this study, depending on which negotiators are included in the final agreement, it is this value-based operationalization of power that is the focus of this paper. Thus, we might expect that parties who contribute more value to a negotiation will command more power and receive a greater share of the rewards than parties who contribute less value.
Evidence suggests, however, that this relationship between relative power and the allocation of rewards (Emerson, 1964; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) , can be either exacerbated or weakened through the coordination of the negotiation itself (Mannix, 1993b) . Mannix (1993b) discovered that whereas symmetrical caucusing increased the high power party's outcome, joint meetings increased the outcome of the low power party. This difference between caucusing versus joint meetings suggests that we should investigate how the asymmetrical sequencing of negotiations can influence the allocation of rewards. At least two predictions can be formed.
Importance of asymmetrical caucusing. By engaging in asymmetrical caucusing, a negotiator is excluded from part of the discussion and the ability of the excluded member to influence the negotiation is reduced. This outcome arises for three reasons. First, as a negotiator is increasingly separated from the process of negotiation, the negotiator's ability to argue on their own behalf and pressure others to receive a greater share of rewards (i.e., using their physical presence to make it more difficult for others to ignore their interests) is significantly reduced (Asch, 1951) . Second, even if the exclusion of a negotiator from part of the discussion is unintentional, it may be sufficient to create out-group categorization effects. These categorization effects will reduce the likelihood that negotiators perceive themselves as part of the larger group and foster more individualistic orientations, which should lead members who are included in the caucus to favor themselves over those who are excluded in their allocation of rewards (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, 1982; Brewer & Kramer, 1985) . Finally, since parties in a caucus should have more frequent interactions with one another than with those outside the caucus, it should lead them to attribute more positive emotions and form stronger affective commitments to caucusing members (Lawler & Yoon, 1993) and hence favor each other over in the allocation of rewards. All of these reasons, therefore, suggest that parties who are excluded for part of the discussion will receive a smaller share of rewards than negotiators who remain throughout the discussion. HYPOTHESIS 1. Negotiators who are excluded from part of the discussion will receive a smaller share of rewards than those who remain throughout the discussion.
Importance of when asymmetrical caucuses occurs. To the extent that the presence of a negotiator during discussion allows that party to argue for their interests, however, we might expect that differences in allocations should also arise from when negotiators are excluded. Specifically, since the early phases of discussion may be more heavily focused on the orientation of group members and the sharing of information, it may be primarily near the end of the negotiation that final decisions regarding allocations are made. If this notion holds true, the most beneficial time for negotiators to argue their case to increase their share of rewards may be in the latter half of the discussion. Whereas negotiators who are excluded from only the beginning of a discussion possess the opportunity to argue their case at this time, negotiators who are excluded at the end of a discussion miss this opportunity and may, therefore, be unable to secure a significant share of rewards. Thus, for those who are excluded from part of the negotiation, parties who are excluded from the latter half of the discussion should receive a smaller share of rewards than those who are only excluded from the beginning. HYPOTHESIS 2. Negotiators who are excluded from latter half the discussion will receive a smaller share of rewards than those who are excluded from the beginning.
The ability to claim a larger share of rewards represents only part of a negotiator's success, however. To develop a complete picture, it is also important to consider the total value of rewards negotiators are able to divide (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) . This dimension depends on the ability of negotiators to resolve negotiations effectively by capitalizing on opportunities for joint gain (i.e., solutions that allow one or more parties to benefit without hurting other(s)). By doing so, these integrative solutions increase the total value of the negotiated settlement and increase the value of each percentage of reward parties gain. Evidence suggests that the development of integrative solutions can be significantly influenced by the way in which negotiations are structured.
Integrativeness
Although the inclusiveness of settlements can often determine the resources available in a negotiation (i.e., because settlements that include the contributions of more parties are able to draw on a greater pool of resources), differences in the available pool of resources do not necessarily mean that these resources have been fully exploited. Thus, the following sections will consider how (1) the formation of fully inclusive versus noninclusive agreements (which determines the size of the resource pool) and (2) the integrativeness of settlements (which has been operationalized as the degree to which negotiators satisfy their mutual interests, irrespective of the available resource pool) can be influenced by asymmetrical caucusing in group negotiations. By doing so, it will assess two alternative explanations for these effects-(1) the heightening of competitive orientations and (2) constraints on the ability of low power parties to contribute to integrative solutions.
Competitive orientations. The exclusion of a negotiator from part of the discussion may be sufficient to increase a groups competitive orientation even if this exclusion occurs through arbitrary means (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, 1982; Brewer & Kramer, 1985) . Tajfel et al. (1971) discovered, for example, that the mere categorization of a group into two subgroups by random and trivial preferences was sufficient to cause participants to favor members of their newly defined in-group over out-group members (intergroup bias). Moreover, the experience of being an isolate, for negotiators who are excluded from part of the discussion, may threaten an individual's sense of well-being within the group, leading to increases in negotiators' competitive orientation (Kramer, 1991; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) . Even when this isolation is temporary, exclusion may create feelings of suspicion and concern and increase negotiators' competitive behavior (Palmer & Thompson, 1995) .
It is unclear whether competitive orientations per se can improve or interfere with the development of integrative solutions. Some studies have shown that competitive orientations can increase aspirations,which in turn increase the level of integration (Huber & Neale, 1986; Pruitt, 1981 Pruitt, , 1983 . Others have found that participants who are instructed to take an individualistic approach in a multiparty, multiissue negotiation develop less trust, impasse more, and reach less integrative agreements than those who are instructed to take a cooperative approach (Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993) .
Prior research on coalitions has generally adopted the latter view of competition as a constraint on integration (Mannix, 1993b; Palmer & Thompson, 1995) . It suggests that whereas joint meetings between all parties are likely to set a standard for keeping the group together, caucusing implies that separating the group and fashioning agreements with less than all the group members are acceptable (i.e., it signals a competitive rather than a cooperative interaction) (Mannix, 1993b) . Moreover, it has been argued that groups who include all negotiators throughout the discussion are better able to discover complex integrative solutions that require trade-offs by all parties (Palmer & Thompson, 1995) . Accordingly, to the extent that this rationale is correct and competitive orientations (1) imply that fashioning agreements with less than all the group members are acceptable and (2) hinder the discovery of integrative solutions, we might expect groups that exclude a negotiator from part of the discussion will (1) be more likely to form settlements that do not include all its members and (2) achieve less integrative settlements, respectively, than groups that retain all negotiators throughout the discussion.
HYPOTHESIS 3. Groups that exclude a negotiator from part of the discussion will be more likely to form settlements that do not include all its members than groups that retain all negotiators throughout the discussion. HYPOTHESIS 4a. Groups that exclude a negotiator from part of the discussion will achieve less integrative settlements than groups that retain all negotiators throughout the discussion.
Importance of who is included and excluded during asymmetrical caucusing.
The effect of excluding a negotiator from part of the discussion on the development of integrative solutions may depend, however, on who it is that is being excluded.
2 Specifically, the effect of excluding a negotiator may depend on the contributions that a specific party would have made to the development of integrative solutions. In dyadic negotiations, evidence suggests that low power parties are responsible for driving solutions of higher joint gain (Mannix & Neale, 1993) . There are at least two reasons why low power parties may drive more integrative settlements. First, low power parties may exert greater effort to fashion solutions with joint gain. Because low power parties cannot rely on their power to gain desired concessions, they must exert greater effort to identify solutions that satisfy the other negotiator(s) while also benefiting themselves. High power parties, in contrast, do not need to exert this effort because their power is sufficient for extracting concessions [i.e., their contribution of resources is sufficient to increase their entitlement and ultimately their share of the reward (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Emerson, 1964) ].
A second reason why low power parties may motivate solutions with higher joint gain is that the presence of a low power negotiator may motivate a more complex manner of thinking in the group. Research on minority influence suggests that the presence of a minority can increase a group's integrative complexity, which refers to the degree to which (a) the situation is considered from multiple perspectives and (b) trade-offs among these perspectives are recognized (Gruenfeld, 1995; Gruenfeld, Thomas-Hunt, & Kim, 1997; Nemeth, 1986 Nemeth, , 1992 Nemeth & Kwan, 1987; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983) . Thus, to the extent that low power parties are more likely to represent a minority opinion than medium or high power parties, their exclusion should reduce the complexity with which they think about the negotiation and thus lower the quality of group settlements.
Whereas these factors should not pose difficulties for groups that exclude a high power party from part of the discussion (i.e., because they are less actively engaged in searching for integrative solutions), the responsibility low power negotiators possess for driving integrative solutions suggests that the exclusion of the low power party from part of the discussion should prove particularly problematic for the quality of the group's settlement. Accordingly, to the extent that it is the exclusion of the low power party from part of the discussion (rather than the competitive orientation created by excluding any party from part of the discussion) that primarily hinders the discovery of integrative solutions, we might expect groups that exclude the low power party from part of the discussion will achieve less integrative settlements than groups that exclude the high power negotiator. HYPOTHESIS 4b. Groups that exclude the low power negotiator from part of the discussion will achieve less integrative settlements than groups that exclude the high power negotiator from part of the discussion and groups that retain all negotiators throughout the discussion.
METHOD

Participants
Participants included 249 full-time MBA students (83 triads) enrolled in negotiation courses who completed the study as a class exercise. Class sections ranged from 30 to 40 members, and the exercise was run in the eighth week of each 10-week course. Thus, students had already interacted with each other in several previous negotiation exercises and were fairly sophisticated in negotiation and role-playing.
Procedure
Participants were assigned to three-person groups and randomly assigned to a high, medium, or low power role. The experimental design manipulated meeting dynamic (entry vs departure vs control) and power dynamic (movement by high-vs low-power party) in the negotiation as between groups variables, and negotiator power as a within groups variable.
Participants were assigned to triads, given background and role playing instructions, and instructed that they would be involved in a three-party negotiation (adapted from Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1997) in the week before the exercise was run. On the day of the study, the experimenter explained the task, answered any questions, and then sent the triads to separate rooms to negotiate. Participants were given a total of 40 min to complete the negotiation. They were asked to negotiate for 20 min and complete a preliminary agreement form, then negotiate for an additional 20 min and complete a final agreement form. The preliminary agreement form was completely nonbinding (i.e., carried no weight on final outcomes); it was simply used to provide a consistent temporal benchmark for the experimental manipulations. In addition, although these agreement forms only needed to be completed and signed by the departments that were included in the consortium, groups were instructed to show these signed agreements to all three parties.
Task
Participants completed an exercise called "The Rainbow Company," which was adapted from an exercise developed by Polzer, Mannix, and Neale (1997) . Each subject played the role of a representative from one of three departments in the Research and Development (R&D) division of the Rainbow Company: Blue, Green, and Yellow. Participants were told that the CEO of the Rainbow Company had decided that the R&D division should improve its ability to respond to market demands through interdepartment collaboration and was willing to supply the new "R&D consortium" with funds from other parts of the organization to encourage this endeavor. Thus, two sources of funding would be provided if two or three departments in the R&D division could agree on a consortium-an operational fund, which would pay for computer equipment, staff support, and personnel training, and a general fund, which could be used for any R&D purpose. The goal for each negotiator was to gain as many dollars for their department as possible.
Each participant received four pages of materials. The first two pages contained role instructions, payoff schedules for the three issues in the operational fund, and a payoff schedule indicating the amounts from the general fund that would be awarded depending on the consortium formed. The third page contained a preliminary agreement form and the fourth page contained a final agreement form. Participants were informed that they must agree on a particular consortium, the allocation of the operational fund across the issues of computer equipment, staff support, and personnel training, and the distribution of the new general fund to the departments.
The payoff matrix for the general fund indicates that the total value of this fund varied depending on the type of coalition formed. The size of the general fund was maximized when all three departments were included in the final coalition, but it also varied for two-department coalitions, depending on which departments were included in the coalition. However, once the size and type of coalition was established, departments in the coalition ultimately faced the difficult task of allocating these resources. This difficulty arose because (1) the size of the general fund grew at a diminishing rate when coalitions moved from two-to three-party membership (e.g., while a two-way coalition consisting of departments Blue and Green would receive $550,000 in the general fund, a three-way coalition consisting of departments Blue, Green and Yellow would only receive an additional $100,000) and (2) larger distributions to one department necessarily required smaller distributions to one or both of the others.
For the issues in the operational fund, however, the interests of the departments were not completely opposed. Rather, opportunity existed for integrative agreement (i.e., joint gain). These integrative settlements could be achieved by constructing trade-offs among the three issues in a manner that capitalized on each department's unique and idiosyncratic preferences. Specifically, while each department possessed specific preferences for each of the issues in the operational fund, the priorities of each department for these issues were different. Because of these differences, departments could increase joint gain by trading concessions on less valued issues for those with greater value. Thus, although it was not at all immediately obvious that the parties cared more about different issues, these differences permitted some negotiated settlements to be better for all parties involved than others.
Experimental Manipulations
Movement dynamic. The movement dynamic in the negotiation (entry vs departure vs control) was manipulated with instructions that determined whether one of the negotiators in each triad entered, left, or remained throughout the negotiation. In the entry condition, one of the three departments was prevented from entering the negotiation (i.e., kept in a separate waiting room) until the other departments completed the first twenty minutes of the negotiation and reached a preliminary, non-binding agreement. In the departure condition, all three departments were present during the first half of the negotiation. However, after the preliminary agreement was reached, one of the three departments was required to exit the negotiation until it was completed. Finally, in the control condition, all participants remained throughout the negotiation.
Power dynamic. The power dynamic in the negotiation (movement by the high vs low power party) was manipulated by altering whether the participant who entered or left the negotiation possessed high or low power. Power was operationalized by the value that a negotiator could add to the general fund. Negotiators who can add more value to the coalitions that include them possess greater entitlement, which allows them to demand a greater share of the reward (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Emerson, 1964; Mannix, 1993b) . Thus, the more value a negotiator could add to the coalition, the greater that person's power, and whether the person entering or departing the negotiation possessed high or low power determined the power dynamic in the negotiation.
Dependent Measures
Dependent measures to assess the amount of joint gain created and the allocation of funds were computed based on negotiator settlements of the operating and general funds. The relevance of these funds depend, however, on whether two-or three-way coalitions are formed.
Integrative settlements. Assessments of integrativeness focused on analyses of the operating fund. The values to each negotiator for the three issues in the operating fund (computer equipment, staff support, and personnel training) were distributed so that each party had a different first priority, second priority, and third priority. Thus, integrativeness could be maximized if all negotiators gained full concessions their most preferred issue.
The integrativeness of agreements reached was calculated in two ways. First, integrativeness was computed through the commonly used measure of joint gain (e.g., Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Mannix, & Neale, 1993; Palmer & Thompson, 1995; Schurr, 1987) , which was computed by adding the value to each negotiator for the agreements reached on computer equipment, staff support, and personnel training. Second, integrativeness was computed according to a revised measure of pareto-efficiency [Pareto Efficiency ϭ 1 Ϫ (the number of agreements Pareto superior to the reference agreement/the sum of the number of agreements Pareto superior to the agreement and the number of agreements Pareto inferior to the agreement)], which has been argued to be a better measure of agreement quality (Tripp & Sondak, 1992) .
This revised measure of Pareto efficiency has been suggested to be a better measure of agreement quality because joint gain confounds two dimensions of negotiated agreements-pareto efficiency and the distribution of resources. Thus, when only a subset of possible Pareto optimal agreements maximize joint gain, the use of joint gain to measure success implies that negotiators should sometimes act against their individual interests for the sake of maximizing joint gain. Pareto efficiency avoids this dilemma by excluding alternatives that require the violation of individual rationality. Tripp and Sondak's (1992) revised measure of Pareto efficiency, furthermore, improves upon traditional measures of this construct by allowing comparisons across studies, excluding irrelevant comparisons among possible agreements, and reflecting the difficulty of the bargaining task in its measurement.
Allocation of rewards.
Assessments of how negotiators allocate rewards considered both the operating and general funds. For the operational fund, departments in the coalition must determine the allocation of resources through the selection of options for computer equipment, staff support, and personnel training. For the general fund, these same departments must determine the allocation of resources by actually distributing the money. Thus, the allocation of resources to a given department was computed by adding the amounts the department received from the operational and general funds.
Planned Contrasts
Several planned contrasts were also developed, a priori, to test the hypotheses concerning the impact of movement dynamic and power dynamic on negotiated outcomes. The experimental design had four conditions created by the 2 ϫ 2 design (movement dynamic and power dynamic) and an additional control condition. Accordingly, four planned contrasts were specified. The contrast weights are specified in the Appendix.
Contrast one compared allocations and total outcomes for negotiations in which a party entered or left the negotiation (i.e., experimental conditions) with those in which all parties remained throughout the discussion (i.e., the control condition). Contrast two compared allocations to negotiators with high power who entered or left the negotiation with those to negotiators with low power who entered or left the negotiation. Contrast three compared allocations to negotiators who left the negotiation with negotiators who entered the discussion and negotiators who remained throughout the discussion. Finally, contrast four compared settlements for groups in which the low power negotiator entered or left the negotiation with those in which the high power negotiator entered or left the negotiation and those in which no movement occurred (i.e., the control condition).
RESULTS
All 83 groups reached agreement. Fifty groups reached agreements including all three participants and 33 groups reached agreements with only two participants. Comparisons were first made to determine whether the movement and/ or power dynamic influenced the incidence of two-and three-way coalitions. Separate analyses were then conducted for groups that reached two-way agreements, groups that reached three-way agreements, and groups that reached either two-or three-way agreements to determine the effects of these manipulations on the level of integrativeness and the allocation of rewards. Finally, an additional set of analyses was conducted to examine the relationship between preliminary and final agreements.
Two-versus three-way agreements. Two-way agreements are different from three-way agreements because the size of the general fund varies markedly for two-way agreements, depending on the kind of coalition formed. Three-way coalitions, in contrast, receive a general fund that is always constant and at the maximum. This inherent difference between these groups has led some to argue that direct statistical comparisons between two-and three-way coalitions are unacceptable (Mannix, 1993b) . There are two reasons, however, to allow these kinds of comparisons in this study.
This study avoids comparability problems in its assessments of integrativeness by focusing on the operating fund. Since the resources available in the operating fund do not vary depending on whether two-or three-way settlements are formed, the operating fund can be used to measure agreement quality in a manner that can be generalized across these types of settlements. Thus, there should be no inherent differences in the integrativeness of two-and threeway agreements in this study. Indeed the results from two-way, three-way, and combined two-and three-way analyses are virtually identical.
Assessments of allocations, in contrast, are susceptible to comparability problems because they incorporate the operating and general funds. However, analyses including both two-and three-way settlements (conducted by scoring allocations to the missing party in two-way coalitions as zero) produced results that were virtually identical to results from separate analyses of two-and three-way settlements. Thus, given the virtually identical results for two-way, three-way, and combined analyses for both the allocation of rewards and the integrativeness of agreements, results from only the combined analyses will be reported.
Incidence of Two-and Three-Way Coalitions
The potential effects of movement and power dynamics on the incidence of two-and three-way coalitions was examined through 2 . The incidence of twoand three-way dynamics was not influenced by the movement dynamic ( 2 ϭ 0.86, n.s.), the power dynamic ( 2 ϭ 0.37, n.s.), or the interaction between the movement dynamic and power dynamic ( 2 ϭ 0.51, n.s.) in the negotiation (see Table 1 ). 
Allocation of Rewards
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to determine whether the movement and/or power dynamic in the negotiation affected the allocation of resources across negotiators. Recall that two hypotheses were developed regarding the allocation of rewards. Hypothesis 1 predicted that negotiators who were excluded from part of the discussion would receive a smaller share of rewards than those who remained throughout the discussion. Hypothesis 2 predicted that negotiators who were excluded from the latter half of the discussion would receive a smaller share of rewards than those who were excluded from the beginning of the discussion. When appropriate, these hypotheses were tested by comparing allocations across negotiators with the same level of power.
The allocation of funds across negotiators was significantly influenced by the power dynamic in the negotiation (F(1,93) 
Integrativeness
ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether the movement or power dynamic in the negotiation affected the integrativeness of agreements. The level of integrativeness was measured in two ways: (1) through the commonly used measure of joint gain (i.e., the total value of the agreement reached) (e.g., Mannix, & Neale, 1993; Palmer & Thompson, 1995) and (2) through a revised measure of pareto efficiency, which has been argued to be a better measure of the quality of agreements than joint gain (Tripp & Sondak, 1992) Recall that three hypotheses were developed regarding the integrativeness of settlements. Hypothesis 3 predicted that groups that excluded a negotiator from part of the discussion would be more likely to form settlements that do not include all of its members than groups that retained all negotiators throughout the discussion. Analyses investigating the incidence of two-and three-way coalitions (reported above) did not support this prediction. Hypothesis 4a predicted that groups that excluded a negotiator from part of the discussion would achieve less integrative settlements than groups that retained all negotiators throughout the discussion. Finally, Hypothesis 4b predicted groups that excluded the low power negotiator from part of the discussion would achieve less integrative settlements than groups that excluded the high power negotiator from part of the discussion and groups that retained all negotiators throughout the discussion.
Joint gain. The power dynamic in the negotiation influenced the level of joint gain (F(1,79) ϭ 5.20, p Ͻ .05). Planned contrasts revealed that negotiations in which the low power party either entered (M ϭ 563.68, SD ϭ 5.73) or left the negotiation (M ϭ 563.57, SD ϭ 6.67) achieved settlements with lower joint gain than negotiations in which either the high power party entered (M ϭ 576.19, SD ϭ 5.45) or left the negotiation (M ϭ 580.00, SD ϭ 7.21) or negotiations in which no movement occurred (M ϭ 582.86, SD ϭ 6.67) (F(1,79) ϭ 8.11, p Ͻ .01). Thus, Hypothesis 4b was supported.
Pareto efficiency. The power dynamic in the negotiation was found to influence the pareto efficiency of agreements (F(1,79) ϭ 4.10, p Ͻ .05). Planned contrasts revealed that negotiations in which the low power negotiator either entered (M ϭ 0.76, SD ϭ 0.06) or left the discussion (M ϭ 0.88, SD ϭ 0.07) achieved agreements with lower pareto efficiency than negotiations in which either the high power negotiator entered (M ϭ 0.93, SD ϭ 0.06) or left the negotiation (M ϭ 1.00, SD ϭ 0.08) or negotiations in which no movement occurred (M ϭ 1.00, SD ϭ 0.07) (F(1,79) ϭ 6.26, p Ͻ .05). Thus, Hypothesis 4b was again supported.
Relationship between Preliminary and Final Agreements
Simple regressions were also conducted to determine whether the allocation of rewards or level of integrativeness were influenced by preliminary agreements. The allocation of rewards in the preliminary agreement was not found to influence the allocation of rewards in the final agreements (F(1,53) ϭ 1.13, n.s.). Likewise, the level of joint gain in the preliminary agreements was not found to influence the level of joint gain in the final agreements (F(1,67) ϭ 1.03, n.s.). The pareto efficiency in the preliminary agreements was found to influence the pareto efficiency in the final agreements (F(1,67) ϭ 5.65, p Ͻ .05). Each percentage increase in the pareto efficiency of preliminary agreements increased the pareto efficiency of final agreements by 0.24%. However, this relationship explained only a small fraction of the variation in the pareto efficiency of final agreements (R 2 ϭ 0.08).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to explore whether the delayed entry of a party into a negotiation or the continuation of negotiations after a party left the discussion (i.e., movement dynamic) influenced the allocation of resources or the quality of the agreement reached. Also of interest was whether these outcomes were influenced by the relative power of the party that entered or left the discussion (i.e., power dynamic). The importance of both of these variables was supported by the results.
Negotiators excluded from part of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who remained throughout the discussion, and those excluded from the latter half of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those excluded from the beginning. Also, groups that excluded the low power party from part of the discussion achieved less integrative settlements than groups that excluded the high power party from part of the discussion and groups that retained all parties throughout the discussion. These findings confirm the notion that the manner in which negotiations are coordinated can affect their distributive and integrative nature.
Potential Limitations
One concern is that the results may have been influenced by the completion of preliminary agreements halfway through the discussion. Although the preliminary agreement increased the likelihood that groups were at similar phases during the manipulations, they may have also (1) artificially anchored the second phase of the negotiation or (2) provided negotiators who remained throughout the discussion a strategic information advantage. There are reasons, however, to discount these concerns.
Anchoring. There was little empirical support for the notion that preliminary agreements "anchored" the second phase of the negotiation. Neither the allocation of rewards nor the level of joint gain in preliminary agreements was found to influence the allocation of rewards or the level of joint gain, respectively, in final agreements. In addition, although the pareto efficiency of preliminary agreements did influence the pareto efficiency of final agreements, it influenced only a small fraction of the variation.
Information advantages. Although the observed differences in the allocation of rewards is consistent with an "information advantage" explanation (i.e., negotiators who remained throughout the discussion received greater allocations when a party was excluded from the latter half of the discussion than in any other condition), post-experiment feedback discounts this possibility. It suggests that allocations were influenced to a much greater degree by negotiators' ability to fashion agreements without pressure from excluded parties. The possibility of "information advantages" from preliminary agreement is also disputed by the results for the level of integrativeness across conditions. Groups who excluded parties from the end of the discussion were not able to exploit an "information advantage," relative to groups who excluded a party from the beginning, to develop more integrative solutions.
The preponderance of evidence, therefore, does not support the notion that negotiators may have reacted to the preliminary agreements in these undesirable ways. Of course, preliminary agreements may have fostered negotiator reactions that are not currently being considered. However, the lack of support for the most likely effects from these preliminary agreements suggests that reactions to preliminary agreements are insufficient to deter reasonably confident interpretations of the results.
Theoretical Contributions
Role of the low power party. By using asymmetrical caucuses to model more accurately the manner in which many group negotiations are conducted, this study provides important qualifications and extensions to the assertions that have been made in the past. The design allows an assessment of whether caucusing per se or the exclusion of the low power party from part of the discussion can explain differences in the quality of negotiated agreements and finds that caucusing only impairs integrative settlements if it excludes the low power negotiator from part of the discussion. The evidence suggests that whereas caucusing may foster competitive orientations in negotiators, these factors alone are not sufficient to impair integrative settlements. Rather, it is by impairing the ability of the low power party to contribute to the discovery of integrative solutions that these detrimental results may arise (Mannix & Neale, 1993) .
There are at least three potential explanations for this conclusion. The first possibility is an aspiration/effort effect. Because low power parties cannot rely on their power to gain desired concessions, they may simply exert more effort to develop integrative solutions so they can satisfy their opponents' interests while also benefiting themselves. If this is the case, the exclusion of the low power party during asymmetrical caucusing should lower the integrativeness of group settlements because it constrains that party's ability to gather information and suggest integrative solutions.
A second possibility is that low power parties do not necessarily suggest more integrative solutions, but that their presence nevertheless increases the level of integrative complexity in the group (Gruenfeld, 1995; Gruenfeld, Thomas-Hunt, & Kim, 1997; Nemeth, 1986 Nemeth, , 1992 Nemeth & Kwan, 1987; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983) . Thus, low power parties may increase the likelihood with which groups view the problem at hand from multiple perspectives and attempt to recognize the trade-offs among them. If this is the case, we might expect that the exclusion of the low power party during asymmetrical caucusing will reduce the likelihood that groups consider the negotiation through multiple perspectives and consider trade-offs among them, irrespective of any effects on the kinds of solutions low power parties suggest.
Finally, a third possibility is that there is no inherent difference in the tendency of low power parties to either suggest integrative solutions or increase a group's integrative complexity. Rather, low power parties may simply less able than high power parties to overcome the effects of exclusion to contribute on these dimensions. If this is the case, the exclusion of the low power parties during asymmetrical caucusing should lower the integrativeness of group settlements because it reduces the willingness of groups to attend to the low power party.
These possibilities suggest that we should explore several aspects of the negotiation process that may be influenced by the low power party. Does the exclusion of the low power negotiator primarily affect that party's ability to develop useful solutions, reduce the complexity with which groups think about the negotiation, or reduce the willingness of others to incorporate these suggestions? Furthermore, are high power parties able to overcome their exclusion because they can leverage their power so others listen to their suggestions, or is their exclusion less important because they are generally less involved in identifying integrative solutions? Research should investigate the ways in which low and high power negotiators can influence the quality of negotiated settlements and the precise manner in which this behavior is constrained through their exclusion.
Importance of participation regardless of power. This study also suggests that the allocation of rewards is affected by whether and when parties are excluded from the negotiation. Whereas the exclusion of a negotiator from any part of the discussion may impair that party's share of rewards, it is much more costly to be excluded in the latter phase of a negotiation than in the beginning. Moreover, when negotiations ended in two-way coalitions, parties who were excluded at the end of the discussion were inevitably excluded from the final coalition. These findings highlight the importance of participating in negotiations to obtain a share of rewards and the importance of being involved in the latter phases of discussion for determining these allocations.
These findings also suggest that negotiators can apply significant influence by being present in the discussion irrespective of the relative power they possess. This notion supplements the literature's general focus on relative power, and the influence that can be leveraged from it, as one of the most important factors in determining a negotiator's share of rewards (e.g., Emerson, 1964; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; Raiffa, 1982; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) by emphasizing the need to broaden our focus to investigate other means through which negotiator influence can arise (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983) . The effects of status and charisma, for example, represent two sources of influence that have been largely unexplored by negotiations research. Related research on these topics suggest that people who are higher in status (e.g., Gray, Griffith, von Broembsen, & Sullivan, 1982; Skvoretz, 1988; Weisfeld & Weisfeld, 1984) and charisma (e.g., Bord, 1975; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Shamir, 1992 ) not only have greater influence and but also make more influence attempts. We would benefit by investigating these alternative sources of influence in the context of negotiations.
Strategic implications. These results also offer concrete suggestions to negotiators planning to engage in group negotiations. They suggest that negotiators should be present throughout the negotiation, particularly in its latter phases, to protect their share of rewards. At the same time, these same results indicate that negotiators may increase their allocations by excluding others in these ways. However, when making these decisions, it is also important for negotiators to consider who it is they intend to exclude.
The results highlight the nonobvious notion that negotiators should retain the low power party throughout the discussion if they are to maximize the value of resources they divide. Even if the inclusion of the low power party seems unnecessary or even detrimental to one's own position in the negotiation, this study suggests that it is these parties that may make important contributions toward increasing the size of the resource pie. Thus, by excluding the low power party from part of the discussion, negotiators may ultimately hurt themselves.
Coalition formation. When making these strategic decisions, however, it is also important to consider the ease with which these kinds of coalitions can be formed. There are several social psychological models that predict the likelihood with which different kinds of coalitions would form, including Caplow's model (Caplow, 1956; Chertkoff, 1967) , Minimum Resource Theory (Gamson, 1961) , Bargaining Theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) , and the Weighted Probability Model (Komorita, 1974 ) (see Murnighan, 1978 , for a review). Although each theory takes a slightly different perspective on the coalition formation process, all of them predict that coalitions with medium and low power parties are most likely to form.
3 This prediction is generally supported by empirical evidence (Chertkoff, 1970; Stryker, 1972; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957) .
Other evidence suggests, however, that when parties participate in several trials with each player playing the same position, coalitions between the medium and low power parties are no more frequent than other types of coalitions (Kelley & Arrowood, 1960) . Thus, the combination of Kelley & Arrowood's (1960) finding and results from this current study suggests a rather striking prediction-that experienced groups will be more likely to form coalitions without the low power party and thus develop lower quality settlements than newly formed groups (who are more likely to include the low power party in the coalition). The possibility that groups may develop lower quality settlements with experience is particularly relevant for organizational groups (Kim, 1997) because their members have frequently worked with one another before. Thus, we would benefit from gaining a fuller understanding of these potentially dysfunctional temporal dynamics in group negotiations.
Forced entry. Finally, it should be noted that the social psychological models and empirical evidence that have been presented regarding the formation of coalitions (e.g., Caplow, 1956; Chertkoff, 1967 Chertkoff, , 1970 Gamson, 1961; Komorita, 1974; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; Stryker, 1972; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957) have generally focused only on the exclusion of parties from the end of a discussion. From this perspective, the formation of a coalition is viewed to be a final act that excludes member(s) irrevocably from the remaining part of the discussion. Thus, the possibility that parties are excluded from the discussion initially but somehow manage to enter the discussion has not been considered. This important oversight suggests that we should investigate the ways in which parties may overcome exclusionary tactics to break into a coalition. What are the factors that help or hinder these efforts? Does the particular phase of negotiation affect the likelihood with which entry attempts succeed? How are the reactions of caucusing members affected by different kinds of entry attempts?
Conclusion. Overall, the results from this study suggest that the exclusion of negotiators from certain phases of the discussion can lead to drastic differences in the settlements that are reached. Although these findings shed some light into differences that may arise from asymmetrical caucusing, it only touches on the reasons why they occur, the myriad ways in which group negotiations can be coordinated, and the changes that may develop with time and experience. It is hoped, therefore, that this study represents only the beginning of new inquiry in this arena. 
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